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Can allowing foreign participation in the banking sector increase real output, despite the imperfectly
competitive nature of the industry? Using a new model of heterogeneous, imperfectly competitive
lenders and a simple search process, we show how endogenous markups (the net interest margin commonly
used to proxy lending-to-deposit rate spreads) can increase with FDI while the rates banks charge to
borrowers are largelyunchanged or actually fall. We contrast the competitive effects from cross-border
bank takeovers withthose of cross-border lending by banks located overseas, which in most FDVHV
reduces markups andinterest rates. Both policies can increase aggregate output and generate permanent 
current accountimbalances.
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Cross-border lending by banks through local branches abroad and arms-length overseas lending
exceeds $31 trillion, more than half the size of world GDP (Bank for International Settlements
(2011) and World Bank (2010)). Not only is the ﬁnancial industry highly globalized, it is also highly
concentrated: the largest 15 multinational banks supply more than 20% of the world’s private
lending.1 Studies of lending by multinational bank aﬃliates show that local lenders taken over by
foreign banks earn higher proﬁt margins post-merger, charging higher markups over lending costs
and possibly cherrypicking the most creditworthy borrowers. Given the imperfectly competitive
environment in the banking sector, under what conditions do cross-border ﬂows of loans through
multinational aﬃliates or arms-length lending actually increase aggregate real output, consumption,
and employment?
The question is a critical one for policymakers, who face the choice of allowing foreign par-
ticipation both through foreign ownership of domestic banks and arms-length cross-border lend-
ing. Although cross-border lending and takeovers, heterogeneity in bank size, and endogenous
markups over lending costs are salient characteristics of the ﬁnancial services industry, open econ-
omy macroeconomics lacks a framework integrating these features to evaluate policies of openness
toward ﬁnancial intermediaries. We build one here. We abstract from the important questions
of risk-sharing and inﬂows of foreign funds that foreign participation may facilitate, analyzed most
recently in models by Agenor and Aizenman (2008) and Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010), to focus
squarely on the balance between eﬃciency gains and the market power that eﬃciency gains may
either build up or erode, depending on foreign banks’ mode of access. While openness to cross-
border bank takeovers and cross-border lending both have the potential to expand aggregate output
and employment, our analysis shows that they have very diﬀerent eﬀects on the structure of lending
costs, bank proﬁt, and interest rates charged to borrowers. Thus, the way a country liberalizes
toward foreign participation in ﬁnancial intermediation is not trivial.
We ﬁnd that aggregate eﬀects are larger for cross-border lending than cross border takeovers.
Under either policy, gains in real aggregate variables are largest in countries where banks have
very poor monitoring abilities and there are high transactions costs involved in obtaining a loan.
In this case, they are 4.5% for output, 4.0% for consumption, and 7.2% for employment when
opening to arms-length cross-border lending, incomparison to ﬁnancial autarky. Aggregate output
and employment increase by only 0.1 percent when these countries open to cross-border takeovers,
with close to zero change in consumption. Gains under either policy are virtually nonexistent
for countries with more advanced ﬁnancial institutions, suggesting that the beneﬁts from foreign
participation for countries with highly developed ﬁnancial sectors come largely through other chan-
nels, such as the risk sharing behavior vividly illustrated in recent work by Cetorelli and Goldberg
(2010) or the convenience of foreign ﬁrms headquartered in the same source country. Nonetheless,
1The 15 largest banks according to asset size are listed in the Euromoney August 2006 issue’s “Bank Atlas.”
Lending is computed from 2006 “net loans” (loans minus loan loss provisions) in the Bankscope database. World
lending is computed as the sum of “net loans” in 2006 for all banks in the database.
1the two types of ﬁnancial openness yield very diﬀerent impacts on interest rates, even in this case
w h e r et h e yh a v el i t t l ee ﬀect on aggregate outcomes.
In our general equilibrium model, heterogeneous banks compete through their choice of interest
rate to supply an identical product (loans). We deﬁne market share through a simple search
process. When ﬁrms can not apply to all banks, only to some fraction of them determined through
optimization and subject to regulatory restrictions on bank reach, then even the most eﬃcient
bank’s market share will be less than one. Firms can not tell what interest rate a bank will oﬀer
until they apply and get a direct quote. Once they collect a group of quotes, they negotiate,
quickly and repeatedly reporting all of the rate oﬀers to all of the oﬀerers, accepting the lowest
ﬁnal rate. In this Bertrand negotiating process, each bank in the subset ultimately oﬀers a rate
equal to its marginal cost of lending... except for the lowest-cost lender. This lender can charge a
markup over its marginal cost, exploiting its cost advantage over its next-best rival for a particular
client. The interest rate it charges is bounded by the marginal cost of its next-best rival or if that
is very high, the point where marginal revenue on the loan equals the marginal cost for the bank.
The result is a nuanced view of foreign participation in the banking sector. Allowing a more
eﬃcient foreign bank to acquire a home bank increases markups as the takeover makes the target
bank even more eﬃcient than the next best rival in each client’s application pool. Yet it has little
eﬀect on interest rates charged to borrowers, since the competing set of oﬀers does not change for
their clients. Thus, it has little eﬀect on real outcomes in the economy. In contrast, liberalization
toward arms-length cross-border lending lowers interest rates. Firms respond to liberalization
in this case simply by sending out a few extra applications to foreign banks. Markups fall, the
eﬃciency of lenders supplying the average borrower falls, and so do interest rates charged on loans.
With lower costs of ﬁnancing working capital, ﬁrms hire more workers and expand their output.
Bank eﬃciency can mean a number of things— how fast a bank transforms deposits into loans,
how fast and how well it liquidates nonperforming loans (loss given default), and how accurately it
screens borrowers. We build a benchmark model using an information-neutral approach, motivated
by the ﬁrst two concepts of eﬃciency, and then show how one can also nest screening in the model
to consider the implications of information externalities after cross-border takeovers. The precise
quantitative implications of information externalities— where the biggest banks “cherry pick” or
“cream skim” the most creditworthy borrowers— in the context of foreign direct investment by
ﬁnancial intermediaries is a subject of ongoing empirical debate which we do not resolve here. In-
stead, we draw insight from comparing the implications of our model in the presence of information
externalities with existing empirical ﬁndings based on borrower-level banking data. We conclude
that while information externalities clearly exist and even dominate in the poorest countries, the
preponderance of evidence suggests that they do not outweigh the eﬃciency-driven eﬀects in our
benchmark model when it comes to interest rate setting by foreign-owned banks in middle- and
upper-income countries.2 Further, we use our model to estimate the parameters governing the
2As an example, the strong eﬀect of information externalities wrought by foreign banks in the poorest countries is
shown most recently and deﬁnitively by Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008). However, evidence of the externality
disappears when they include middle- and upper-income countries in their sample.
2distribution of bank size for a panel of 80 countries. For 22 countries, including about half of the
OECD countries, our estimate of  is less than 1. These distributions have a fat tail, meaning that
banks in the upper quantiles of the size distribution are very big relative to the median. The result
suggests that the distribution of bank size could potentially so disperse that some characteristic
organic to individual banks in part drives the enormous variance in their cost of lending, in addition
to variance in the quality of local pools of borrowers.
Our work helps to ﬁll a gap in existing models of banks. A wealth of insightful studies in
the banking literature illuminate the impact of market structure on markups while either requiring
banks to be identical or exogenously limiting the number of banks to one, two, or three.3 As m a l l
number of new open economy macroeconomic models analyze the role of imperfect competition in
the banking sector on aggregate outcomes (Olivero (2010), Agenor and Aizenman (2008), Gerali,
Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2010), and Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010)). They generate important
new insights into phenomena such as risk sharing, market integration, and market concentration,
but either assume that banks are identical or assume a constant elasticity of substitution between
loans from diﬀerent sources that yields a constant markup over the cost of lending. The framework
closest to ours appears in Mandelman (2006 and 2010). These studies analyze very diﬀerent
questions and do not involve direct participation by foreign ﬁnancial intermediaries. Mandelman
(2006 and 2010) allows an endogenous number of heterogeneous banks to choose their (endogenous)
markups, ingeniously drawing on limit pricing models in industrial organization. A distribution
of markups emerges as all banks charge the same interest rate to avoid revealing their eﬃciency
levels to competitors. In our model, banks may set diﬀerent interest rates and the same bank
may charge a diﬀerent interest rate to diﬀerent borrowers solely based on the set of competing
oﬀers that each borrower has in hand after the application process. The distinction allows us to
diﬀerentiate between the eﬀects of cross-border takeovers versus arms-length cross-border lending
on the interest rates that borrowers pay on loans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the structure of the model
in a closed economy to show how competition in the credit market drives net interest margins,
interest rates, and aggregate output. Section 3 describes the micro- and macro-level impacts of
participation by foreign ﬁnancial intermediaries as acquirors of home banks and, separately, as
arms-length lenders. We discuss in depth how the results coincide with empirical studies. Section
4 concludes with a discussion of supplemental policy prescriptions for each type of liberalization.
2 A Model of Heterogeneous Banks in Financial Autarky
The model economy is composed of consumers, ﬁrms, and banks. For simplicity, there is no
depreciating physical capital and any potential shocks that could aﬀect demand or production in
3See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for an excellent overview, as well as Dell’Arriccia, Friedman and Marquez (1999),
von Thaden (2004), Dell’Arriccia and Marquez (2004 and 2008), Lehner and Schnitzer (2008) and Eden (2010).
Freixas, Hurkens, Morrison, and Vulkan (2007) innovate by considering banks with heterogeneous screening capabilites
and endogenous markups ex ante. Ex post, only one type of bank survives.
3a particular period are already realized at the time agents make their decisions. Thus, we omit
time subscripts in our exposition except when describing the consumer’s savings behavior below.
This simpliﬁed framework allows us to concentrate on the modelling of the banking sector, and still
derive the key general equilibrium implications.
Our objective is to analyze the eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness on aggregate variables in two diﬀerent
scenarios: entry of foreign banks via mergers and acquisitions (foreign direct investment), and arms-
length cross-border lending. We begin the description of the economy under ﬁnancial autarky, with
special emphasis on the banking sector.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households in the interval [01]. Individuals in this economy consume a
ﬁnal good and work in the ﬁrms which produce it. They have funds each period that are deposited
at a bank in return for an interest payment. Households are assumed to own both ﬁrms and banks,
so at the end of every period they receive dividends from these activities.














where  is consumption and h is labor supply in period . The exogenous parameters  and 
are, respectively, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of labor supply. Each






subject to the following budget constraint:
+1 +  ≤ (1 + ) + h + Π
 + Π
 
where  are one-period deposits at the banks,  is the real wage, 1+ is the gross market interest
rate on deposits, and Π
  and Π
 are total proﬁts remitted as dividends from ﬁrms and banks,
respectively. We assume that the market for deposits is perfectly competitive and consumers are
indiﬀerent with regard to the banks where they deposit their funds. The Euler condition from the
consumer’s maximization problem yields the long run the rate of interest on deposits, ¯  = 1
 − 1.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive ﬁrms in the interval [01] that produce the ﬁnal good
devoted to consumption. They are owned by consumers and can remit proﬁts to consumers in the
form of dividends. Let the aggregate price level of the homogeneous domestically produced ﬁnal
4good ( ≡ 1) be the numeraire. Technology is given by ()=()1−,w h e r e() is the amount
of labor employed by ﬁrm  and () is the amount of the ﬁnal good that it produces.
Every period, in order to produce, ﬁrms need to hire workers. They have no initial funds, so
they borrow the wage bill from the ﬁnancial intermediaries. There is a continuum 1o fb a n k s
in the economy. Firms can apply to any bank for a loan. We suppose for now that all ﬁrms
are identical in terms of their risk proﬁle to focus on the interaction between bank eﬃciency and
deregulation, but relax this assumption later. A fraction 0 1o fﬁrms are hit by a random
exit shock in any period and replaced by new entrants, so that the number of ﬁrms in the market
is kept constant over time. Firms are otherwise identical in every respect except the interest rate
they negotiate with a bank. The number of banks to which a ﬁrm applies for a loan is limited
by one of two things, either the application fee charged by each bank, , or regulatory constraints
that de facto or de jure limit the number of banks competing over a particular customer to be no
more than ¯ . The regulatory constraints may derive from geographic segmentation or regulations
governing the market for a particular type of credit instrument.
We will see below that each additional loan oﬀer improves ﬁrms’ bargaining power when nego-
tiating the ﬁnal loan contract, so they want to apply to as many banks as possible. In the absence
of the application fee, ﬁrms would apply to all banks. In practice, each ﬁrm applies to the same
fraction of banks, ()= for all ,01The actual number of loan applications () that
the ﬁrm sends out must always be positive and is the minimum of an unrestricted optimum (˜ )
and the restricted number of competitors allowed by regulators,
 =m i n {˜  ¯ }
The problem of the ﬁrm therefore consists of two parts. First, each ﬁrm chooses how many
applications to send, ˜ ,t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h ee ﬀect of the negotiated interest rate on proﬁt.








()1− − () − ()()
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where () is the total amount of loans borrowed by the ﬁrm, ()i st h ei n t e r e s tr a t ec h a r g e do n
loans to ﬁrm ;  is an aggregate productivity parameter, and 1:˜ (()) is the probability that the
best oﬀer a ﬁrm  gets after applying for loans from ˜  diﬀerent banks stipulates an interest rate
less than or equal to (). This probability is the same for all ﬁr m sa sl o n ga st h e ys u b m i tt h e
same number of loan applications. Notice that the expected proﬁt is computed over the probability-
weighted range of interest rates that the ﬁrm obtains from its applications. We show below that the
expected interest rate is falling in the number of applications. We assume that the new entrants
4W ef o c u so ns t e a d y - s t a t ea n a l y s i sa n dt h u so m i tt i m es u bscripts. Since the subjective discount factor for
consumers who own ﬁr m se q u a l sac o n s t a n t( ) in steady state, we ignore the discount factor without loss of generality.
5simply take over the headquarters of the failing ﬁrms, including their banking relationships, so that
each new ﬁrm captures the value of the search by its predecessor— it need not search again unless
it elects to do so.
Recent developments in the ﬁnance literature show that the payment of dividends solves an
important agency problem that shareholders in many countries ﬁnd more important than completely
avoiding external ﬁnancing costs (see DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) and Denis and Osobov
(2008), for instance).5 For simplicity, we assume that this agency problem is extreme and that in
equilibrium, stockholders insist upon remission of all proﬁts as stockholder dividends, forcing the
ﬁrm to externally ﬁnance all working capital:
()=() (1)

















1:˜ (()) = ˜  (3)
2.3 The banking sector
Banks take deposits from households and lend funds to ﬁrms. Each bank has an idiosyncratic
managerial eﬃciency. For analytical tractability below, we assume that these eﬃciency levels
vary across banks such that the cost  of lending one unit for a bank picked at random is Weibull
distributed. In our information-neutral benchmark model, the cost parameter is analogous to a
monitoring cost if one imagines each borrower as naively applying for a loan to ﬁnance a project
from banks that have a diﬀering ability to force the ﬁrm to pursue a good project versus a bad one.6
It can also be a repudiation cost as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) if the banks can not screen or
monitor, but liquidate ﬁrms in default (sell them oﬀ to the new entrants) with diﬀering eﬃciency
levels. Or, it can simply represent managerial know-how in converting deposits into loans quickly.
In Section 3.2, we introduce default and show that the cost can also represent the frequency of
errors when screening. The key is that the cost drives a wedge between the rates that banks pay
on deposits and the minimum interest rates they can charge to lenders, whether it is due to risk,
eﬃciency, or both.
5Speciﬁcally, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) ﬁnd that the 25 largest publicly traded U.S. companies with
a history of paying dividends in 2002 could have amassed cash holdings of 51% of assets rather than 6% of assets
through retained earnings. Yet they chose to hold long-term debt worth more than 20% of their assets rather than
self-ﬁnancing. The authors build the case that stockholders do not want to leave large amounts of retained earnings
in the hands of managers, who could otherwise use ﬁrm proﬁts without monitoring by lenders and possibly against
the interests of stockholders. Denis and Osobov (2008) ﬁnd similar evidence for a panel of industrialized countries.
6We are grateful to Monika Schnitzer for this suggestion.
6As mentioned above, there is a measure of banks 1 in the economy, a number that can be
taken as exogenous or determined endogenously by a free entry condition shown in Appendix B.2.
The important factor is the number of banks that each ﬁrm applies to for a loan. Let () ≥ 1
for all  denote the non-interest cost parameter of the th most eﬃcient bank within the group of
 banks that a ﬁrm  applies to for a loan. For now, we motivate these costs as management
and operating costs that slow the transformation of deposits into performing loans or liquidation
costs in the case of ﬁrms hit by exit shocks, but below we also consider them in terms of risk and
screening. The bank’s cost per dollar of loans supplied is ¯ (), which includes the risk-free rate
¯  paid to depositors derived from the Euler equation of the consumer’s problem.
Each ﬁrm negotiates with the banks it applies to, forcing banks to compete so that only the
bank making the lowest ﬁnal oﬀer to a particular ﬁrm will be chosen as the ﬁrm’s lender. Given
the direct price competition, the bank with the lowest cost among all of the banks to which a ﬁrm
submitted applications becomes the sole lender.7 The unit cost function for the low-cost lender
to ﬁrm  is thus ¯ 1(), with ¯ 1()=m i n{¯ ()}. Further, this low-cost lender can not charge
more than the marginal cost of its next-best competitor for the ﬁrm’s business. Otherwise it will
be undersold. The low-cost lender would like to charge the proﬁt maximizing interest rate,8
˜ ()=¯ ¯ 1()
where ¯  = 1
1− is the maximum markup a bank will charge given the ﬁrm’s technological con-
straints. However, the lender can only charge ¯  if its next-best competitor is much less eﬃcient,
so that it does not bound the lender’s choice of interest rate: ¯ 2()  ¯ ¯ 1(). We assume that
regulatory policy and coordination costs exist limiting the extent of domestic mergers and in order
to focus on cross-border mergers below. We begin our analysis from a point where all domestic
merger opportunities by assumption already have been exhausted, so that very eﬃcient banks are
not engaged in the process of buying up competitors to drive up their markup to ¯ .
The duopolistic competition between banks competing for individual borrowers implies that the
lending-to-deposit rate spread is ultimately endogenous. Thus, we have the interest rate negotiated








with proﬁt from the transaction for the bank supplying credit to ﬁrm  equal to
()=()()+ − ¯ ()
where () represents loans supplied by the best bank negotiating with ﬁrm ,  is the application
7A very small number of banks will never be the low cost lender in any ﬁrm’s pool of oﬀers. These banks which
lose out in every negotiation and do not lend to ﬁrms sell their deposits in the interbank market at the risk-free
interest rate ¯ . The distributions of bank lending costs described below provide a built-in weighting to account for
this phenomenon.
8We write the bank’s simple proﬁt-maximization problem used to derive this interest rate in Appendix B.1. It is
the rate for which the marginal cost of lending equals marginal revenue on any loan.
7fee paid by ﬁrm  to the bank, and () is the amount of deposits received by the bank from
households.9 Due to data constraints, many studies have used net interest rate margins as a proxy
for the spread between ()a n d¯  when analyzing the impact of ﬁnancial sector liberalization on
borrowing costs. Few authors have had access to actual data on lending and deposit rates and
instead rely on measures of the net interest margin (NIM). However, using the model we can show
that the markup is closely related to the NIM. The log markup is given by
log()=l o g() − log ¯ 1()
The “wide” NIM on loans to ﬁrm ,10 equal to total interest revenues minus total interest expen-
ditures divided by assets equals
()=
()() − ¯ ()
()
= () − ¯ 1()
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d()=1()() Thus, the model’s depiction of markups is easily reconciled
with existing empirical research. An increase in the markup as lending costs fall implies an increase
in the NIM.
2.4 Distributions for cost parameters and the markup
To close the model, we need to specify the distribution of costs for banks, which allows one to
calculate the distribution for markups. We assume that the cost parameters across the measure 
of banks are Weibull distributed,
()=1− −(−1)

with positive support over [1∞)11 The probability that a bank can loan out funds for less than
the rate of interest on deposits (i.e., 1) is zero. In our benchmark case, which we expand in
Section 3.2, the probability of default and the cost of recouping defaulted loans is fully embodied
9Since households are indiﬀerent regarding where to deposit, the amount of deposits held in any particular bank,
(), diﬀers across banks only due to diﬀerences in banks’ requirements for deposits to make loans. Banks transform





, ∀()  1; (4)
that is, more eﬃcient banks (lower ()) would be able to supply more loans out of deposits than less eﬃcient ones
because their superior monitoring gives them lower expected losses. We assume for simplicity that bank working
capital is thus drawn from deposits, but the same cost structure would result even if working capital were derived
from the funds of bank owners, since the opportunity cost of putting up the funds would be the rate of interest on
deposits.
10This is deﬁnition 4w in Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000, p.122) a n di sa l s ou s e db yC l a e s s e n s ,D e m i r g u c - K u n t ,
and Huizinga. (2001), among numerous others.
11This is akin to assuming that banks draw an eﬃciency parameter  from a Fr´ echet distribution of the form
()=1− 
−−
, given a support over (01 ]a n dw i t hu n i tc o s tg i v e nb y¯  =
¯ 
. The Weibull function used here
implies that the marginal cost of loaning one dollar is greater than or equal to the gross deposit rate (1). The
Fr´ echet distribution is also known as the “inverse Weibull.”
8in this cost parameter. We assume that ﬁrms randomly select the banks to which they send loan
applications, so the probability that ﬁrm  submits an application to any particular bank is 
.12
The share of ﬁrms served by a bank with cost parameter  is simply
()=1:()=2( − 1)−1−(−1)

where 1:() is the probability that a bank with a cost parameter no higher than  serves any
individual ﬁrm.13 This share is decreasing in the number of applications  and decreasing in the
lending cost  at an increasing rate, so banks with lower costs are progressively bigger.
Given  competitors for ﬁrm ’s business, let 1 represent the eﬃciency level of the most eﬃcient
(lowest-cost) lender and 2 the eﬃciency level of the second most eﬃcient (second lowest-cost) lender
in the group of ﬁrm ’s  loan applications. Using a standard formula from order statistics (Rinne
2009, p.24) one can derive the joint density for the two lowest record values, −1(1 2)a n dt h e
marginal density for 2,
2(2)=( − 1) (2 − 1)
−1 −(2−1)(−1)
This marginal distribution for the cost of the second-best rival for any given borrower’s business
depends on the number of loan applications  that the borrowers submit. We use this parameter
to embody the concept of contestability examined empirically in the cross-country banking study
by Claessens and Laeven (2004).
The markup charged by the bank lending to ﬁrm  is ()=
()
¯ 1(). The lowest-cost bank
(1()) wants to charge the highest markup possible subject to both the cost of its next most
eﬃcient competitor (2()) for ﬁrm ’s business and the elasticity of the ﬁrms’ demand for loans
embodied in , which ensures that the bank does not extract more interest than the ﬁrm can








We assume that bank eﬃciency levels are constant over time, making the markup a constant unless
there is an inﬂux of new competitors due to liberalization.
2.4.1 Simulating the distribution of markups
Before simulating the distribution of markups, we estimate for 80 countries the parameters , ,
and the minimum cost, which up to now we have supposed to be one, but actually could be as
12The subset of banks to which a ﬁrm applies need not be completely randomly selected. If there is merely a small
degree of uncertainty surrounding the interest rate oﬀer before applying to a bank, the model can transform into a
constant elasticity of substitution framework, as described by Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992), in which case
the setup takes a form very similar to Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Atkeson and Burstein (2007).
The qualitative results are similar to those here.
131:()=1− 
−(−1)
is the cumulative distribution of the ﬁrst order statistic from ()g i v e n random
draws (applications). We discretize the measure of banks  in the simulations below.
9large as the money multiplier. Results are reported in Table 1. Using the ratio of deposits to
loans reported in Bankscope to proxy for the cost parameter of each bank in each country and
without using any priors, we ﬁnd that our estimates for  spread fairly evenly around estimates
reported for manufacturing ﬁrms by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003, hereafter BEJK).
We ﬁnd a median  of 0.48, corresponding to Spain, and a median  among OECD countries of
1.52, corresponding to Denmark. For half of our sample and 25 of the 30 OECD countries, the
entire 95% conﬁdence interval for  lies below 2, implying that the distribution is fat-tailed. Given
that lower cost is associated with higher market share (increasingly so as costs fall) and the fact
that the ﬁrst order statistic from samples taken from a Weibull distribution is also Weibull, with
the same shape parameter as the underlying distribution, then the distribution of bank size will
also be fat-tailed. We believe that this enormous dispersion in bank size supports the view that
in addition to any variation in the quality of their local pools of borrowers, organic management
practices of the banks themselves must also govern their cost eﬃciency, and thus their individual
size.
Using the median estimates for  and , a simple simulation demonstrates that we obtain a
distribution of markups with a probability density of roughly Pareto shape, shown in Figure 1a,
similar to BEJK (2003) from which we draw the type of Bertrand competition used here. The
simulation is done by ﬁrst taking 100 cost draws (i.e. we discretize the total number of banks 
to equal 100)14 from a Weibull distribution of the form given by ()a b o v e . W es u p p o s et h e r e
are 1000 ﬁrms and that the application cost is small enough that they each decide to send 10 loan
applications, drawing 10 of the 100 lending cost parameters. For each ﬁrm, we determine 1(),






,w h e r e¯  is calibrated using the maximum net interest margin from a
sample of 80 countries in Bankscope in the year 2000. The parameter ¯  is approximately 12515
Finally, the entire distribution of lending costs, markups, and interest rates is simulated 1000 times.
The x-axis of Figure 1 is the markup value, and the y axis the probability that any of the markups
is within a narrow bin of markup values.
2.4.2 Contestability
Notice that we have set the number of potential rivals equal to 10 in this example. Because the
distribution of markups here is not separable from the distribution of 2, it also depends on the
level of contestability  in the market (as seen in the formula for (2) above). To illustrate, Figure
1b shows the probability density for markups if the level of contestability is extremely low— the
application cost is high enough that  is only two. The number of banks in the entire banking
industry charging very low markups (near  = 1) is dramatically reduced, shifting the mass of
the density to the right, toward ¯  = 1
1−. In fact, as  grows, the distribution appears more
14The qualitative results do not depend on the value of . We can not observe how many banks a ﬁrm is aware
of when deciding how many loan applications to submit, so we examined the robustness of our results to values of 
from 15 to 500.
15Speciﬁcally, Bankscope reports a maximum net interest margin of a little more than 22 percent.
10Pareto-like, matching the stylized distribution in BEJK.16 Due to its impact on the distribution of
markups, increasing contestability (an increase in ) on average reduces the interest rate charged
to any particular ﬁrm.
2.5 Aggregation and Equilibrium
We see in equations (1) and (2) that the amount of credit demanded by any ﬁrm  depends on the














(1 + ())− 1

The next step is to deﬁne equilibrium and the properties of the steady state. An equilib-
rium under autarky is deﬁned by a set of quantities and prices such that households, ﬁrms, and
banks solve their maximization problems, while clearing the markets for labor, goods, and loans:
{¯ ()()()}. For simplicity and without loss of generality in the closed
economy, we assume that regulation is a binding constraint, so that  =¯ . The equilibrium con-
ditions emerge from the consumer’s intertemporal optimization (derived Appendix A); the ﬁrm’s
demand for labor and loans; banks’ price setting; the goods, deposit, and loan market clearing
conditions; and the aggregate supply of loans. These are shown for the steady state in Table 2.
Given the duopolistic setup, the interest rate charged by any given bank will depend on the second
most eﬃcient rival for each ﬁrm. We use simulations of the model to analyze the evolution of the
spreads and all associated macro outcomes.
3T h e m a r k u p , ﬁnancial sector openness, and the cost of funds
From this point, the characterization of ﬁnancial sector liberalization is important to predict the
impact of liberalization on interest rate spreads. We start by expanding the model to allow arms-
length loans from banks located abroad, increasing the ease with which home ﬁrms can apply
to and borrow from banks located overseas. “Importing” bank loans from abroad in this way
can have very diﬀerent implications for the distribution of markups than allowing cross-border
takeovers. In a ﬁnancially open economy, home ﬁrms will apply to  domestic banks, plus ∗

foreign banks in search of a loan. The expected markup decreases in the number of applications
abroad. At the same time, the expected cost of the best bank a ﬁrm ﬁnds within one particular
country is decreasing in the number of applications, but at a decreasing rate (the ﬁrst derivative of
[1()] with respect to  and [∗
1()] with respect to ∗
 are both positive, but the second
derivatives are negative). Simulations in Figure 2 for two identical countries calibrated as described
above demonstrate that the distribution of markups and interest rates under autarky stochastically
16In a somewhat simpler framework, de Blas and Russ (2010) explain analytically why this distribution converges
to Pareto as  grows.
11dominate the distributions under cross-border lending.
Thus, a ﬁrm concentrates search in its home country, but always chooses to send at least one
application abroad, subject to the size of the foreign application fee. However, Buch (2005), Buch,
Driscoll and Ostergaard (2010) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) all ﬁnd that distance presents
frictions that inhibit lending. Degryse and Ongena (2005), in particular, ﬁnd that distance leads
to price discrimination in interest rate setting across markets. In our theory, a bank’s markups will
decrease with greater distance from the borrower and increase with greater distance between the
borrower and competing banks, as the extra costs of lending at a distance eat away proﬁt margins.











with 1. Yet our simulations in Figure 2 show that reducing the distance friction from 10 percent
of marginal cost to zero has only a very small for symmetric countries with high contestability
( = ∗
 = 10). Quantitatively, we ﬁnd that distance matters little whenever the distribution
of bank cost parameters is fat-tailed (1) or close to fat-tailed (2), as we ﬁnd in our
estimation above for two-thirds of our 80-country sample. Under this condition, the technological
superiority of the best banks overpowers the distance friction when it comes to price competition,
even though Figure 2 shows that the distance does increase the marginal cost of lending in a way
that aﬀects interest rates more distinctly. However, in results not reported here, we ﬁnd a more
noticeable eﬀect of distance on markup behavior when the distribution of ﬁr mc o s t si sl e s sd i s p e r s e
(3).
Next, we consider liberalization that allows foreign takeovers of home banks. In doing so, we
provide a theoretical motivation for why spreads may actually increase relative to interest rates
among banks taken over by a foreign parent, but without increasing interest rates, as documented
in empirical studies discussed below. The intuition is straightforward and hinges on heterogeneous
levels of eﬃciency among banks. First, consider a world where banks cannot make overseas loans,
but can buy existing banks overseas to lend in the local market. Buch (2003) reports evidence
suggesting that parent banks are more eﬃcient than the banks they acquire. Suppose that the
foreign bank is more eﬃcient than a home bank with cost parameter , ∗  , but the unit cost
of the merged bank after a foreign takeover is some average of the two technologies. For instance,






with  ≥ 1.17 The foreign bank may introduce better computers, worker training, branch
security, or improved screening and monitoring technologies that put information already collected
17The assumption is in the spirit of Nocke and Yeaple’s (2007) modeling of foreign direct investment given mobile
versus immobile technologies—the technology here is partially mobile, as the foreign parent must rely on the acquired
ﬁrm for some know-how to help navigate the local market. In a more elaborate framework with asymmetric
information, the acquired bank might have important information about the creditworthiness of local borrowers.
12by the target to better use in administering loans.
Because the foreign bank will be able to improve the operations of the home branch after a
merger, it can charge lower lending rates, lend out more money, and increase proﬁt in the targeted
bank. We assume that mergers take place through equity swap arrangements such that the merged
banks splits proﬁts according to the cost shares of the target and the parent resources (1− 1
 and
1
, respectively). Firms do not have to re-apply for loans from targeted banks after a takeover if
they are already borrowing from the target. However, ﬁrms do have to apply and pay the requisite
application fee to get an updated oﬀer from any other merged bank, even if they have applied to
the targeted bank in the past. Moreover, they do not know which banks other than their current
lender have merged. This friction implies that the takeovers only aﬀect the current clients of
targeted banks. Takeovers do not induce switching unless the merged lender raises rates above the
next-best oﬀer that the ﬁrm reported when negotiating its original rate.
The merger process starts with the most eﬃcient bank in each country looking for a partner. A
cross-border takeover occurs if the proﬁt that a target bank  would earn after a merger is at least as
large as its current proﬁt, given its current client base:
()
  (). A target has to be eﬃcient
to be attractive as a match. Yet it can not be so eﬃcient that it already makes a very high proﬁt
(()). Thus, the most eﬃcient banks and the least eﬃcient banks in each country are the least
likely targets of a foreign takeover. When countries have asymmetric levels of ﬁnancial development,
the resulting pattern of takeovers mirrors the limited global advantage hypothesis tested by Berger,
DeYoung, Genay, and Udell (2000). Speciﬁcally, banks from a country with superior management
technologies will be able to take over targets at the upper end of the domestic eﬃciency spectrum
in the host market (U.S.-owned banks tend to operate with greater cost eﬃciency than competing
domestic banks abroad, for instance). However, foreign-owned banks originating in countries with
inferior technologies will only be able to purchase banks toward the lower end of the eﬃciency
spectrum in a more ﬁnancially developed host market, so the eﬃciency of foreign-owned banks will
be lower on average than their domestic counterparts.
What is the impact of the mergers on markups? The matching process generates a distribution
of markups under direct investment liberalization that stochastically dominates the distribution of
the markup under either autarky or loan liberalization. The markup increases in all merged banks
that were not already charging ¯ . The markup never increases for local banks that are not bought
out by foreigners. To show the overall eﬀect on the distributions, we use the same data from
the simulation above, paired with data generated for a foreign country using an identical process.
Then, each bank in each country makes an oﬀer to the most eﬃcient overseas bank that has a cost
draw inferior to its own, continuing down the eﬃciency spectrum until all potential matches are
made, with no more than one acquisition per parent bank. The distribution of markups under
FDI liberalization lies to the right of (stochastically dominates) the distribution under autarky
shown in Figure 3, meaning FDI increases the average markup in the host country. Eﬃciency
gains and pressure from incumbent rivals prevent the increased markups from translating into
higher borrowing costs. Since it arises from the acquiror’s cost advantage, the increased markup is
13completely oﬀset by the fall in costs: the average interest rate is virtually unchanged, and actually
falls a miniscule amount: the mergers increase banking sector eﬃciency to a degree that supercedes
the impact of increased market power within targeted banks. This is evident in the bottom panel
of Figure 3— the cumulative distribution of interest rates for ﬁnancial FDI is almost identical to
that for autarky. Thus, we can say unequivocally that FDI need not increase lending rates, even
though it increases markups.
This result stands in stark contrast to the eﬀect of arms-length cross-border lending seen in Fig-
ure 3. In the top panel, the cumulative distribution function for markups under loan liberalization
billows to the left, above the cumulative distribution for autarky. Thus, while the distribution of
markups under FDI stochastically dominates the distribution under autarky, we see in Figures 3
and 4 that the distribution of markups under loan liberalization is stochastically dominated by the
autarkic distribution. Further, while lending costs fall under both FDI and cross-border lending,
interest rates fall substantially only when foreign loans originate abroad.
3.1 Empirical evidence on loan pricing after foreign takeovers
How realistic are our results for cross-border takeovers? The most salient fact emerging from
studies of liberalization in the banking sector is that common measures of lending-to-deposit rate
spreads in local banks taken over by foreign ﬁnancial institutions do not fall, in part due to an
increase in market power. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) ﬁnd that net interest margins are the
same or higher for foreign-owned banks compared to their domestic counterparts in a study of ﬁve
Latin American countries. The margins are greater for banks entering via M&As and, importantly,
the eﬀect decreases with the age of the merger. Vera, Zambrano-Sequin, and Faust (2007) show
that net interst margins in Venezuela increased approximately 4 percent within four years of the
inﬂux of foreign participation initiated by the passage of legislation in 1994. Manzano and Neri
(2001) also note an increase in net interest margins in the three years following the Philippines’
liberalization toward foreign entry in 1994. Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (1999) report not only
that increasing measures of spreads followed an inﬂux of foreign participants in Columbia’s banking
sector in 1992-96, but also that the increase was in large part attributable to increased market power.
In addition, it is likely that when NIMs rise after mergers, it is due at least in part to the transfer
of superior technology just as in the model. Claessens, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) ﬁnd
reduced proﬁtability but no change in the net interest margins of domestic banks following entry
by foreign competitors and that foreign owned banks have higher net interest margins and proﬁts
than domestic banks in developing countries but not in industrialized countries. It is also clear
that heterogeneity is important in a model of mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector.
Vennet (2002) documents that acquiring banks in cross-border mergers within the euro area are
larger, more eﬃcient, more proﬁtable, and have higher loan-to-asset ratios. Buch (2003) interprets
evidence from aggregate variables as indicating that parent banks are more eﬃcient than the banks
they acquire overseas. Eﬃciency also correlates with bank size in the model and the data. In
particular, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) ﬁnd using individual bank balance sheet
14data that large banks have lower non-interest expenses, including personnel costs. Thus, when
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) take place, one can expect that they will involve a
larger, more eﬃcient foreign bank taking over a smaller, less eﬃcient domestic bank.
While these studies examine the behavior of bank-level net interest margins before and after a
foreign takeover and show that NIMs increase after takeovers as in our model, only a few examine
interest rates at the borrower- or loan-level. Hetland and Mjos (2010) ﬁnd that both domestic
and foreign takeovers of Norwegian banks between 1997 and 2008 led to lower interest rates and
expanded availability of credit post-merger. Recent studies of domestic takeovers in the United
States (Erel 2011) using loan-level interest rates and Spain (Montoriol-Garriga 2008) using interest
rates reported at the ﬁrm level echo this ﬁnding, reporting a drop of 10-15 basis points in post-
merger interest rates charged to continuing customers. In a study of Italian ﬁrms, Sapienza
(2002) ﬁnds that 75% of mergers resulted in a drop in interest rates, while 10 percent resulted in
higher rates. Among the sample where rates fell, she reports a drop of about 20 basis points to
continuing customers. These studies can not observe what happens to customers who switch banks
p o s t - m e r g e rt om e a s u r eac o m p o s i t i o ne ﬀect. However, we discuss below how these ﬁndings relate
to issues of cherry picking in our model.
3.2 Risk and Cherry Picking
An important literature modelling information and risk in lending suggests that a reduction in
lending costs for the lowest-cost lender may increase markups and lending rates, as it allows the
lender to exploit an information advantage over its next best rival in any pool of banks. This
mechanism is often associated with “cherry picking” or “cream skimming” superior borrowers.
Dell’Arriccia and Marquez (2008), for instance, brilliantly show that reductions in the cost of funds
(the deposit rate) can result in increased interest rates charged to all borrowers. The idea is that
a drop in the deposit rate for a bank that already has a lower cost of funds allows it proﬁtably
to expand its lending to lower-quality borrowers. The best bank then leaves only the very worst
borrowers— the ones with the lowest likelihood of repayment— for its rival to serve. The drop in
the marginal cost of the best bank ends up increasing the marginal cost of its rivals through the
cherry picking eﬀect.
In our model, we might think of the cost parameter as reﬂecting the ability of the bank to screen
its loan applicants. As a very simple example, suppose that a predetermined fraction  of ﬁrms will
either default, with 0 ≤ 1, which results in an exogenous portion  of the loan principal lost
in recovery eﬀorts, 0 ≤ 1. The ﬁrm does not know in advance if it is going to default or not,
but the bank can imperfectly detect defaulters. As in Dell’Arriccia and Marquez (2008), neither
the ﬁrm nor the bank can credibly transmit any information about the ﬁrm’s creditworthiness to
another bank. We reinterpret the cost parameter as a function of the bank’s screening ability,




15where the fraction 1
 is now the likelihood that a bank misses a defaulter when screening and
suﬀers a loss on the loan, with 0  1
 ≤ 1. The screening parameter is distributed inverse Weibull,
bounded from below by 1, so that the cost parameter is still distributed Weibull, but now as
ˆ ()=1−−()(−¯ )−
. A bank can win a borrower anytime that it has the lowest cost within
the pool of rival banks where the ﬁrm applied. Since costs are still distributed Weibull, all of
the results with respect to markups in the closed and open economy remain intact if there are
no information externalities. However, anytime the superior bank has a screening process that is
better than a coin ﬂip (2), then its next best rivals for any borrower’s business will confront a
pool of applicants with a fraction of defaulters greater than  and increasing in the superior bank’s
screening level .18 Banks thus experience a negative information externality when competing
with better screeners.
A cross-border takeover may introduce technology that helps local banks use their existing
information to screen more rigorously, increasing  and intensifying the information externality for
incumbent rivals. The cherry picking reduces the lending cost of a merged bank and simultaneously
increases the marginal cost of its next best rival for any client. Thus, with information externalities
a merger should bring about both increased markups and increased interest rates. Do merged banks
exploit this additional cost advantage from the information externality in a way that outweighs the
eﬃciency eﬀects driving the core results in our model?
If the information externality dominates the eﬃciency mechanism driving our results, we would
see increased interest rates, as merged banks would exploit the adverse spillover eﬀects of their
improved screening on their rivals’ marginal costs. Though there is considerable evidence that
foreign banks cherrypick reducing their exposure to the riskiest borrowers relative to domestic
banks (for borrower-level evidence, see Sapienza (2002), Montoriol-Garriga (2008), Hetland and
Mjos (2010), Gormley (2010), and Erel (2011)), the only study we are aware of which tracks
loans for borrowers who discontinue borrowing from a recently merged bank ﬁnds no eﬀect on the
interest rates that they pay when turning to other lenders (Montoriol-Garriga 2008). Of the studies
mentioned here that measure actual interest rates charged to borrowers and control for borrowers’
risk proﬁle, all show that on average mergers (particularly cross-border mergers) are associated
with downward or no movement in interest rates to speciﬁc borrowers. Gormley (2010) also shows
that lending to continuing borrowers in India expands after a foreign takeover, which in our model
is consistent with lower rates.19
18In particular, the next best rivals of a lender with screening ability 2w i l lr e c e i v eap o o lo fr i v a l sw i t ha
















 is the probability that the superior bank gets an application from and rejects a defaulter and
1
(1−)
is the probability that it gets an application from and rejects a non-defaulter.
19In addition, Claessens, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) oﬀer evidence that domestic banks appear to increase
their eﬃciency following entry by foreign banks. Goldberg (2007) suggests that increased eﬃciency among unmerged
local banks could occur due to technological spillover from foreign entrants to these locally owned competitors, or
induced cost-cutting behavior, including eﬀorts to step up screening to counteract cherry picking by foreign banks.
In the case of technological spillover or cost-cutting, the technology parameter, , would presumably be higher for the
16We believe that information externalities, including the related changes in the composition of
banks’ clients, are very important to understand how banks respond to changes in relative marginal
costs after a merger. Yet here we ask a diﬀerent question, which is independent of the composition
eﬀect from information externalities— whether the increased market power stemming from mergers
documented in empirical studies of net interest margins can derive from technological improvements
that also lower interest rates for continuing borrowers, or at least prevent the increased market
power from resulting in increased rates, as documented in empirical studies. Our model reconciles
this dichotomy in a framework with a large number of heterogeneous banks charging endogenous
markups.
3.3 Closing the open economy model
Since the impact of ﬁnancial openness on the aggregate interest rate is computable using only
data from the simulated cost parameters, it is possible to solve for all variables in terms of the
aggregate interest rate using the open economy version of the steady state equations in Table 2.
We transform the consumer’s budget constraint (3) and the goods clearing condition (11) into two
new equations,
 =  + 










 +¯  ((3’))
 =  +  +  ((11’))
where  and  denote the quantity of the manufactured good that is produced in the home
and foreign country, respectively, and consumed in the home country. Proﬁts earned by home
and foreign banks, respectively, in the home country are represented by 
 and 
 .V a r i a b l e s
representing consumption, production, or payments taking place in the foreign country are denoted
by asterices. For instance, ∗
 represents proﬁts earned by home-owned banks in the foreign
country. The balance of payments equation is given by
 = ∗










 is foreign consumption of goods imported from the home country. Put simply, a positive
home net exports must be ﬁnanced by the positive net proﬁts of foreign banks operating in the home
country. Analogous equations apply to the foreign country in equilibrium. The open economy
diﬀers from autarky because bank proﬁts now include activity from making loans abroad, be it at
arms-length under loan liberalization or in local branches with FDI. Trade does not have to be
balanced if bank proﬁts, net of takeover fees, are greater for one country than another. With the
foreign-owned banking industry than for the indigenous banks, or 
∗ , at the time of liberalization. One should
then observe a leftward shift in the distribution of cost parameters for surviving indigenous banks over and above
the selection eﬀect involved in liberalization, an empirically testable implication that we leave for future research.
17interest rates already known from computations above, we reduce the model into two equations (the
aggregate budget constraints) and two unknowns,  and ∗, then solve using a nonlinear equation
solver.
3.4 Aggregate impact
We simulate the model for ﬁve diﬀerent scenarios. Results are presented in Table 3 for foreign
takeovers and Table 4 for loan liberalization as percentage changes relative to autarkic levels. The
ﬁrst two cases (Models 1 and 2) are for symmetric countries with a technology ()a n ds h a p e( )
parameter similar to an industrialized country like Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, or the U.S.
The ﬁrst case assumes that contestability is high and in the second case it is low. The last three
have settings where the home country has inferior ﬁnancial technology reﬂected in one or both
parameters in the Weibull distribution of cost parameters, which we match to the estimates for
Argentina. In all cases, we set  equal to 1.1, a 10 percent distance friction involved in cross-
border lending, and  equal to 3 so that foreign-owned banks capture one-third of the proﬁt
of target banks and pay the rest as dividends in a stock swap to buy out the target.20 We hold
the number of banks in the economy  constant ( = 100) in all cases. Overall, we ﬁnd that
liberalization has the potential to increase output, consumption, and employment when countries
with inferior ﬁnancial technologies or low contestability liberalize toward arms-length cross-border
lending. Liberalization toward foreign takeovers yield less impact on aggregate outcomes in all
cases due to the ability of foreign-owned banks to oﬀset eﬃciency gains with increased markups
after mergers.
Table 4 demonstrates that moving from autarky to loan liberalization when countries have high,
symmetric levels of ﬁnancial development (Models 1 and 2) generates a very small expansion in
aggregate output and employment. Interest rates fall modestly in these cases, particularly when
contestability is low ( = ∗
 = 2), as the additional competition from foreign banks puts
downward pressure on markups. The drop in markups is small, implying that much of the fall in
interest rates is due to some ﬁrms stumbling upon very eﬃcient foreign banks when they search
abroad. Allowing foreign takeovers in these symmetric cases (the analogous Models 1 and 2 in
Table 3) has almost no impact at all on interest rates or the real economy. Cross-border takeovers
do increase markups as expected, particularly when the countries have low search frictions so that
markups were low before opening up to foreign takeovers. When domestic contestability is low, a
higher proportion of target banks already charge the maximum markup under autarky, so there is
little room to increase them further.
When countries are asymmetric with respect to the technology parameter ,a si nM o d e l s3a n d
4, consumption also increases less than output under either policy, generating an equilibrium trade
surplus.21 The trade surplus arises because the home country pays interest on an excess of loans
20Qualitative results are robust to a wide range of , while quantitative results to not change much, since the
inﬂuence of FDI is already rather small in our framework.
21When countries are identical, either country can run a small trade surplus or deﬁcit, depending on the particular
draws of cost parameters by individual banks.
18from banks headquartered in its ﬁnancially superior neighbor in terms of exported goods. Opening
toward foreign arms-length lending increases equilibrium output by a whopping 4.55 percent when
the home country has a technology parameter similar to that of Argentina and the foreign country
has technology similar to that of Norway, given a similar dispersion parameter () for both high
and low contestability in the home market. Markups fall in both cases and the interest rate also
falls dramatically— a 4.61 percentage point level change with high domestic contestability and a
17.58 percentage point level change with low contestability. (Note that the interest rate oﬀered
to borrowers begins at a higher level under low contestability and low technology.) Liberalization
toward foreign takeovers in these cases, Models 3 and 4, have little impact on interest rates or
aggregate outcomes.
The most interesting change occurs in Model 5, where we suppose that the country with the
lower ﬁnancial technology not only has a technology parameter equal to Argentina’s, but also a
more narrow range of bank technologies, so that the more ﬁnancially developed country outpaces
the home country both on average and in particular at the upper end of the eﬃciency spectrum. In
this case, markups actually increase with loan liberalization, by 5 percent. Home ﬁrms pay lower
interest rates, but the most eﬃcient foreign banks are so far superior to the most eﬃcient home
banks that home ﬁrms can not easily use oﬀers from home banks to negotiate better rates from
foreigners, even when they have 10 domestic oﬀers in hand. Markups increase more than 10 percent
with liberalization toward foreign takeovers and eﬃciency gains within target banks are such that
interest rates fall almost one half of a percentage point despite the gaping rise in markups. Thus,
not only the mean but also the dispersion of bank costs matters for market structure. Equilibrium
consumption actually falls slightly with openness to foreign lending and with foreign takeovers,
as the home country pays extra interest to foreign banks in the form of a wider permanent trade
surplus. Claessens and van Horen (2009) ﬁnd that foreign-owned banks have higher proﬁt margins
in developing countries than in industrialized countries. They interpret their results as indicating
that “technical and regulatory advances of foreign banks from high income countries make it easier
for these banks to make proﬁtable investments in developing countries (p.12),” a result we clearly
ﬁnd here.
Welfare is virtually unchanged in all cases. We have assumed that all domestic lending is
ﬁnanced using domestic deposits. The disutility of extra labor outweighs the increase in con-
sumption, as consumption increases are dampened by the extra saving needed to ﬁnance working
capital when ﬁrms expand. Building in capital ﬁnanced through bank lending could mitigate this
result, as lower ﬁnancing costs would increase the level of the physical capital stock, increasing the
marginal product of labor. A fully dynamic framework is likely to capture additional welfare gains,
since risk sharing may be an important reason why funds ﬂow across borders, particularly within
multinational banks. Discerning how endogenous markups among heterogeneous lenders inﬂu-
ences the allocation of funds ﬂowing across borders due to risk sharing and diﬀerences in ﬁnancial
development is fertile ground for future research.
194 Conclusions
This study presents a stylized model for analyzing the implications of ﬁnancial sector openness
for consumption, welfare, and the components of the balance of payments. It focuses on the
interaction of imperfect competition and bank heterogeneity with endogenous markups—the ﬁrst
to do so in a general equilibrium environment. We ﬁnd that opening the ﬁnancial sector to
mergers and acquisitions by foreign acquirors can increase average net interest margins (markups),
an ubiquitous proxy for lending-to-deposit rate spreads, while still generating eﬃciency gains that
reduce the cost of borrowing overall. Information externalities can mitigate this result, but we
survey recent studies and determine that they do not dominate it, but rather support our theoretical
predictions.
Most importantly, we demonstrate that the choice of channels for allowing foreign participa-
tion in domestic ﬁnancial intermediation is not trivial. While cross-border bank takeovers increase
m a r k u p sa n dh a v el i t t l ee ﬀect on interest rates charged to borrowers, cross-border lending decreases
both markups and interest rates. Although cross-border lending has exhibited considerable volatil-
ity during ﬁnancial crises in developing countries, the potential beneﬁts arising from lower markups
under this mode of liberalization has gone largely explored in empirical studies. The results invite
further exploration into supplemental policies to maximize the beneﬁts from foreign participation in
the ﬁnancial sector. Given that dividends from a buyout could be an important source of gains from
cross-border mergers for developing countries which exhibit low dispersion in bank cost (2),
joint venture requirements for foreign bank entry may be an optimal policy if the local ownership
requirement is set low enough that it does not strongly discourage foreign entry. Similarly, a tax
on interest earnings from arms-length cross-border loans may be analogous to an optimal “tariﬀ”
policy for countries with less developed ﬁnancial sectors characterized by low dispersion in bank
size. Our model underscores the importance of these questions and provides a new framework to
examine them in future research.
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A Consumer First-Order Conditions























 = ¯ 
−
+1
¯  + h + 
 + 
 = +1 + 
BM a r k u p s a n d E n t r y
B.1 The maximum markup
The maximum markup is the markup the bank would charge if it were maximizing proﬁt— setting
marginal revenue equal to marginal cost and taking into account the fact that ﬁrms respond to a
higher interest rate by reducing the amount they borrow. Speciﬁcally, in the absence of competition
from rivals, a bank with cost parameter  would set its interest rate to maximize proﬁt when lending
to each ﬁrm ,
max
()
{()} =m a x
()
{()() − ()}
















24Using the labor demand equation (2), the condition reduces to the interest rate ()= 1
1−,
implying a maximum markup over marginal cost equal to 1
1−.
B.2 Free entry condition
The total number of banks in the economy, ,d o e sn o ti n ﬂuence our discussion of markups in an
qualitatively important way, so for simplicity we take it as an exogenous policy decision. However,
one can easily endogenize this parameter. Suppose there is a cost to enter, such that banks must
set aside an amount ,0in their initial period of operation. This cost could be considered a
type of capital requirement or cost of regulatory compliance. Let “entry” into the banking industry
by an entrepreneur be the act of drawing a lending cost parameter from the Weibull distribution.
Suppose also there is some probability ,01 that a bank will be forced to exit in any
period due to an errant manager or a change in regulatory policy. Then, if entrepreneurs enter the

























The deﬁnition of market share (()) in Section 2.4 in the main text shows that market share for any
bank is decreasing in . Assuming that when deciding whether to enter the banking industry, each
entrepreneur takes the degree of search  by any ﬁrm as given, then expected proﬁt is monotonically








,t oz e r oa s →∞ . Thus, there must be
some unique  such that expected proﬁte q u a l s  0.
C Estimation of Key Parameters
We estimate the parameters of the Weibull distribution on banking costs for a sample of countries
for the year 2000. We use data from Bankscope for 80 countries and ﬁt a Weibull distribution
for costs to match the distribution of the ratio of deposits to loans observed for each country.














,  = 2,a n d˜  = −.W e s e t  equal to 1 in the main text to
minimize notation, but verify here that this is a reasonable simpliﬁcation. We estimate 1 and 2
25by maximum likelihood. The parameter ˆ  is then obtained from the median of the distribution for
each country. The parameter  corresponds to the shape parameter in the Weibull function, which
governs the dispersion of bank costs and thus bank size. Eaton and Kortum (2002) ﬁnd estimates
of  between 3.6 and 8.32. With endogenous markups, BEJK ﬁnd  =3 29. In our case, ˆ  is the
maximum likelihood estimator based on the distribution of costs (the ratio of deposits to loans)
across all banks in each country. Our ﬁndings show values for ˆ  between 0.521 and 11.6, a range
which encompasses values reported in these previous studies for manufacturing ﬁrms. We use the
standard bootstrap method to obtain 95% conﬁdence intervals.
D Equilibrium
The set of equations governing the steady state open economy equilibrium is given in the table
below. It is similar to the closed economy version in Table 1, plus four new equations, which
include an augmented budget constraint (3’) and market-clearing equation (11’). In Table 5,
0
()r e p r e s e n t st h e lowest-cost bank applied to by ﬁrm  in the home country under ﬁnancial
liberalization. Under loan liberalization, this could be either a home or foreign bank. If it is a
foreign bank, then 0
()=∗
(), where ∗
()i st h e lowest-cost foreign bank to which home
ﬁrm  sends an application. With FDI, this could be either a fully domestically owned home bank
or a merged bank. If the bank that supplies loans to ﬁrm  is acquired by a foreign bank, then its













(a) nJ = 10









(b) nJ = 2
Figure 1: Less search moves mass of the probability density for markups to the right
cost of lending and markups changed as described in the text.




































Loan Liberalization with Distance
Loan Liberalization no Distance
Figure 2: Arms-length cross-border lending reduces markups and interest rates






































































Figure 4: Probability densities for markups under autarky, cross-border lending, and cross-border
takeovers
30Country ˆ  (ˆ  ˆ ) ˆ  (ˆ ˆ )ˆ 
Andorra 0.00 (0.00 , 0.00) 5.65 (2.55 , 12.50) 0.90
Argentina 0.05 (0.00 , 0.18) 4.40 (3.04 , 6.38) 0.97
Australia 0.62 (0.39 , 0.88) 0.53 (0.44 , 0.64) 0.80
Austria 0.59 (0.34 , 0.89) 0.61 (0.50 , 0.74) 0.86
Bahamas 0.17 (0.01 , 0.53) 0.85 (0.55 , 1.33) -1.19
Bahrain 0.16 (0.03 , 0.45) 0.83 (0.51 , 1.34) -2.76
Belarus 0.03 (0.00 , 0.27) 4.94 (2.38 , 10.30) 1.18
Belgium 0.37 (0.19 , 0.62) 0.58 (0.46 , 0.73) -0.07
Bermuda 0.38 (0.12 , 0.75) 0.70 (0.45 , 1.07) 0.00
Brazil 0.33 (0.19 , 0.55) 1.15 (0.97 , 1.35) 0.77
Canada 0.54 (0.32 , 0.80) 1.31 (1.06 , 1.62) 0.98
CaymanIsl 0.23 (0.01 , 0.76) 0.49 (0.30 , 0.80) -6.00
Chile 0.25 (0.04 , 0.58) 6.78 (4.51 , 10.20) 0.99
China 0.06 (0.00 , 0.17) 4.71 (3.25 , 6.81) 0.86
CostaRica 0.28 (0.07 , 0.60) 3.61 (2.63 , 4.97) 0.92
Croatia 0.03 (0.00 , 0.28) 5.07 (2.74 , 9.37) 1.04
Cuba — — — — —
Cyprus 0.28 (0.01 , 0.75) 1.31 (0.83 , 2.05) 0.56
CZRepublic 0.07 (0.00 , 0.41) 2.43 (1.32 , 4.47) 1.01
Denmark 0.78 (0.45 , 1.19) 1.54 (1.12 , 2.12) 1.19
ElSalvador 0.03 (0.00 , 0.31) 15.90 (9.44 , 26.60) 0.96
Estonia 0.21 (0.01 , 0.91) 2.13 (1.19 , 3.82) 0.54
Finland 0.73 (0.27 , 1.45) 1.46 (0.91 , 2.33) 1.18
France 0.49 (0.38 , 0.63) 0.58 (0.53 , 0.64) 0.38
Germany 0.47 (0.32 , 0.66) 0.61 (0.53 , 0.70) 0.68
Ghana 0.30 (0.03 , 1.22) 0.83 (0.50 , 1.39) 0.78
Greece 0.34 (0.14 , 0.61) 0.99 (0.73 , 1.34) 0.75
HongKong 0.35 (0.19 , 0.56) 1.92 (1.51 , 2.45) 1.04
Hungary 0.25 (0.04 , 0.57) 1.90 (1.45 , 2.49) 0.91
Iceland 0.31 (0.06 , 0.77) 1.57 (0.87 , 2.83) 0.54
India — — — — —
Indonesia 0.20 (0.03 , 0.45) 1.16 (0.77 , 1.74) 0.76
Ireland 0.49 (0.25 , 0.74) 0.46 (0.35 , 0.61) 0.13
Israel 0.29 (0.03 , 0.84) 3.31 (2.37 , 4.63) 0.92
Italy 0.51 (0.36 , 0.70) 1.21 (1.03 , 1.42) 0.78
Jamaica 0.16 (0.02 , 0.49) 1.48 (0.91 , 2.41) 0.68
Japan 0.55 (0.40 , 0.69) 0.65 (0.60 , 0.70) 0.90
Jordan 0.04 (0.00 , 0.24) 3.68 (2.22 , 6.10) 1.13
Kazakhstan 0.43 (0.11 , 1.05) 0.41 (0.29 , 0.60) -0.47
Table 1: Parameter estimates for Weibull distribution
31Country ˆ  (ˆ  ˆ ) ˆ  (ˆ ˆ )ˆ 
Kenya 0.17 (0.01 , 0.45) 3.21 (2.3 , 4.47) 0.94
Kuwait 0.08 (0.00 , 0.32) 1.86 (1.06 , 3.25) 0.34
Latvia 0.10 (0.01 , 0.35) 1.42 (0.78 , 2.60) 0.23
Lebanon 0.01 (0.00 , 0.06) 3.95 (2.74 , 5.69) 1.02
Lesotho — — — — —
Lithuania 0.08 (0.00 , 0.39) 3.93 (2.14 , 7.22) 0.93
Luxembourg 0.28 (0.10 , 0.70) 0.59 (0.44 , 0.80) -0.63
Malaysia 0.30 (0.13 , 0.53) 2.19 (1.74 , 2.76) 0.90
Mexico 0.34 (0.14 , 0.62) 1.47 (1.15 , 1.87) 0.75
Netherlands 0.48 (0.31 , 0.71) 1.27 (1.04 , 1.56) 0.83
NewZealand 0.66 (0.28 , 1.47) 14.50 (7.17 , 29.4) 0.91
Nigeria 0.15 (0.01 , 0.44) 1.83 (1.20 , 2.79) 0.68
Norway 1.64 (1.20 , 2.56) 3.02 (2.09 , 4.36) 1.11
Pakistan 0.01 (0.00 , 0.05) 4.98 (1.82 , 13.70) 1.28
Panama 0.38 (0.18 , 0.66) 1.35 (1.01 , 1.79) 0.72
Peru 0.00 (0.00 , 0.22) 10.80 (5.41 , 21.80) 0.87
Phillipines 0.02 (0.00 , 0.06) 5.90 (3.93 , 8.84) 0.90
Poland 0.01 ( 0.00 , 0.07) 6.57 (4.06 , 10.6) 0.99
Portugal 0.40 (0.22 , 0.63) 0.70 (0.60 , 0.88) 0.15
Qatar 0.09 (0.00 , 1.01) 6.55 (2.44 , 17.6) 1.08
Romania 0.00 (0.00 , 0.06) 8.23 (3.44 , 19.7) 0.84
Russia 0.38 (0.25 , 0.55) 0.97 (0.83 , 1.14) 0.77
SaudiArabia 0.02 (0.00 , 0.27) 5.21 (2.66 , 10.20) 1.03
Singapore 0.59 (0.34 , 0.95) 0.93 (0.69 , 1.25) 0.81
Slovakia 0.12 (0.00 , 0.50) 2.75 (1.57 , 4.79) 0.58
Slovenia 0.04 (0.00 , 0.25) 7.17 (4.69 , 11.00) 1.00
SAfrica 0.51 (0.30 , 0.75) 1.27 (1.01 , 1.60) 0.79
SouthKorea 0.11 (0.02 , 0.31) 4.73 (3.12 , 7.17) 1.12
Spain 0.48 (0.32 , 0.64) 0.71 (0.62 , 0.82) 0.64
Sweden 0.88 (0.51 , 1.59) 0.96 (0.73 , 1.27) 1.11
Switzerland 0.43 (0.22 , 0.63) 0.41 (0.35 , 0.47) -0.15
Taiwan 0.50 (0.25 , 0.80) 1.20 (0.79 , 1.84) 0.94
Thailand 0.33 (0.10 , 0.70) 3.20 (2.21 , 4.64) 1.00
TTobago 0.52 (0.07 , 1.74) 1.13 (0.60 , 2.15) 1.35
Turkey 0.18 (0.09 , 0.35) 1.74 (1.36 , 2.23) 0.92
Ukraine 0.18 (0.04 , 0.46) 3.07 (2.13 , 4.43) 0.954
UAEmirates 0.25 (0.04 , 0.64) 2.48 (1.68 , 3.67) 0.72
UKingdom 0.35 (0.27 , 0.45) 0.77 (0.70 , 0.86) -0.17
USA 0.48 (0.45 , 0.52) 1.33 (1.28 , 1.39) 0.95
Venezuela 0.02 (0.00 , 0.14) 5.55 (3.13 , 9.85) 0.94
Vietnam 0.13 (0.00 , 0.72) 3.16 (1.64 , 6.08) 0.79
We bootstrap to obtain the 95% conﬁdence intervals in parenthesis.
Table 1: Estimates of Weibull distribution parameters, continued
32Consumers
Labor supply  = h
− 1
 (1)
Euler condition ¯  = 1
 − 1( 2 )
Budget constraint  = h +  +  +¯  (3)
Firms
Technology ()=()1− (4)







Demand for loans by ﬁrm  ()=()( 6 )
Banks
Lending rate ()=m i n{2() ¯ 1()} (7)
Loan supply to ﬁrm  ()=
()
1() (8)
Market Clearing and Aggregation












Goods market clearing  ≡  (11)
Labor market clearing h ≡  (12)
Table 2: Model speciﬁcation under autarky
33%∆ %∆ %∆ %∆() ∆()
(1) Symmetry, high domestic contestability 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.98 -2 b.p.
 = ∗ =0 48,  = ∗
 =1 0 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.66) (1)
(2) Symmetry, low domestic contestability 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.14 -5 b.p.
 = ∗ =0 48,  = ∗
 =2 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (3)
(3) Asymmetry, high domestic contestability 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.16 -9 b.p.
 =0 05, ∗ =1 52,  = ∗
 =1 0 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.15) (7)
(4) Asymmetry, low domestic contestability 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.08 -3 b.p.
 =0 05, ∗ =1 52,  = ∗
 =2 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (1)
(5) Asymmetry, lower home dispersion 0.31 -0.20 0.48 10.48 -49 b.p.
 =0 05, ∗ =1 52,  = ∗
 = 10,  =4 4 (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (2.74) (13)
Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. Changes in markups and interest rates are an average.
All changes are relative to autarkic levels. Level changes in interest rates are expressed in basis points.
 = 
∗ =1 54 in Models (1)-(4). 
∗ remains 154 in Model (5).
Table 3: Simulation Results for Liberalization toward Foreign Takeovers
%∆ %∆ %∆ %∆() ∆()
(1) Symmetry, high domestic contestability 0.06 0.01 0.10 -0.59 -15 b.p.
 = ∗ =0 48,  = ∗
 =1 0 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.21) (4)
(2) Symmetry, low domestic contestability 0.51 0.25 0.81 -2.30 -153 b.p.
 = ∗ =0 48,  = ∗
 =2 (0.11) (0.03) (0.16) (0.34) (25)
(3) Asymmetry, high domestic contestability 1.58 0.65 2.48 -1.44 -461 b.p.
 =0 05, ∗ =1 52,  = ∗
 =1 0 (0.33) (0.23) (0.53) (1.02) (105)
(4) Asymmetry, low domestic contestability 4.55 3.97 7.20 -3.16 -1758
 =0 05, ∗ =1 52,  = ∗
 =2 (0.30) (0.31) (0.47) (0.39) (151)
(5) Asymmetry, low domestic dispersion 1.00 -0.12 1.56 5.04 -215 b.p.
 =0 05, ∗ =1 52,  = ∗
 = 10,  =4 4 (0.07) (0.04) (0.11) (1.41) (0.17)
Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. Changes in markups and interest rates are an average.
All changes are relative to autarkic levels. Level changes in interest rates are expressed in basis points.
 = 
∗ =1 54 in Models (1)-(4). 
∗ remains 154 in Model (5). ∗
= =2 in all ﬁve Models.


















































































Lending rate ()=m i n{
0






2 () ¯ [¯ 
0∗
1 ()]}










Market Clearing and Aggregation
Loan market clearing 
()=

































































Table 5: Model speciﬁcation for the open economy
35